Delayed trains, obsolete N-network: Germany's rail crisis

Written by Sophie Renassia

Published yesterday

If you were asked to name a country where trains are often late, would you perhaps think of France first? It's true that SNCF is quite often criticized by the French for its delays and cancellations. The CEO of SNCF himself raised the alarm on our podcast about the necessity for the State to invest in the maintenance of the French railway network, an essential condition to guarantee the reliability of our public service.

However, one of France's neighbors is a much worse student: Germany. Breakdowns, delays, cancellations... In recent years, Deutsche Bahn (DB), once a flagship of punctuality and efficiency, has lost its splendor. Worse, it is now going through such a crisis that the Swiss Federal Railways now refuse entry to Basel station for German trains that are more than 15 minutes late. In total, Germany has accumulated over 35 billion euros in debt and an estimated investment backlog of 150 billion euros to restore and develop its network. And according to Jean-Pierre Farandou (CEO of SNCF), the French network could well experience the same fate if nothing changes.

As you will have understood, Germany, once a railway model, is now in crisis. How did it come to this, and what can France learn from it? We investigated to understand what caused one of Europe's largest railway networks to descend into chaos. And spoiler: it's not just a budget issue.

The Golden Age and the Fall: From Reform to Disillusionment

A Promising Legacy and an Ambitious Reform

To understand the decline of the German railway, one must go back to 1994, the year of the great German rail reform. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1990, reunified Germany had to make two completely different railway systems coexist. In the West, Deutsche Bundesbahn, an already heavily indebted public behemoth. In the East, Deutsche Reichsbahn, an even more dilapidated socialist network. This is how Deutsche Bahn AG was born in 1994 - a private company but 100% owned by the State - resulting from the merger of the East and West networks. Objective: combine the efficiency of the private sector and public oversight. Thanks to the State, which absorbed the colossal debt accumulated until then (over 30 billion euros of debt!), a new start was possible.

Initially, this reform bore fruit, with an improvement in punctuality (over 90% punctuality in the 1990s-2000s) and a modernization of the network. The model was unprecedented and seemed to prove its worth: a public company operating like a private company, with a logic of partial privatization. But it is precisely this hybrid structure, half public, half private, that would soon pose serious problems.

See also: Great Britain: from privatization to renationalization of the network

Profit at all costs

But from the 2000s, while the "Die Bahn" brand refreshed the image of rail and even exported internationally, problems accumulated behind the scenes. The reason? Quickly, priority was given to cost reduction, sometimes to the detriment of a long-term vision. Since 1994, over 5,400 km of railway lines have been removed, nearly one-sixth of the network, falling from approximately 44,600 km in 1994 to less than 40,000 km today. This contraction of the network was accompanied by job cuts for railway workers and the outsourcing of many activities. While DB was supposed to be profitable while providing a public service, the hybrid public-private model created contradictions. The lack of transparency in the use of public funds, often reinvested internally without real accountability, exacerbated the situation.

Decline of Deutsche Bahn: How did it come to this?

State disengagement and misguided Investments

From the outset, the 1994 reform carried a contradiction: DB was asked to behave like a private company, with profitability objectives, while continuing to provide a public service on a vast and costly network to maintain. In other words, it was expected to generate revenue while transporting everyone, everywhere, all the time. Gradually, the government disengaged from railway funding, hoping for the private sector to take over. But while Deutsche Bahn AG was initially intended to be privatized, the 2008 financial crisis interrupted this process, and the German state still holds 100% of the shares today. And as we will see, this ambivalence of partial privatization has led to numerous contradictions in its strategic management. DB is also forced to pay dividends to the state and invests heavily in costly international projects to the detriment of its national network. The result? Massive indebtedness.

Economic Choices That Paralyze the Network

In parallel, there's a desire to do "more with less" (fewer reserve trains, fewer available drivers, less room for maneuver, fewer specialized engineers), meaning there's no longer any "safety net": the slightest glitch causes cascading train cancellations. These economies also affect maintenance: certain preventive operations, deemed too costly, are reduced. For example, less sand is put in the sandboxes in autumn (which helps trains to brake) or the heating of points is limited in winter. These are seemingly minor changes, but with very real consequences, as they cause more seasonal breakdowns and more delays. In 2009, the German railway experienced a major crisis: more than half of the trains were canceled. The reason? A large part of the trains were deemed dangerous (due to lack of maintenance): brakes and wheels were worn out and the equipment was not up to standard. DB was then condemned to pay compensation to the State of Berlin and seriously damaged its reputation. This is one of the perverse effects of partial privatization: to save money, maintenance is reduced to the strict minimum, even if it compromises user safety. In the 2010s, infrastructure began to seriously saturate and punctuality collapsed, falling below 70% on some major lines. In 2015, DB finally tried to react with a plan called "Future of Rail." But the extent of the damage quickly became clear, and decades of underinvestment dragged DB into a vicious circle. In the 2020s, there was talk of a complete collapse of the German railway. Richard Lutz, one of DB's executives, then spoke of "the worst crisis since the 1994 reform." In 2023, barely 62.5% of long-distance trains arrived on time.

Misguided Management and Rigged Statistics

The management of DB has seen more and more finance professionals replace railway experts. To mask delays, DB even resorted to the "Pofalla maneuver": canceling trains rather than declaring them delayed to artificially inflate punctuality statistics. Another absurdity: a system of fines is supposed to force Deutsche Bahn to act. For example, if it is supposed to repair bridges in poor condition and does not do so, it must pay a fine of 15 million euros. But since paying a 15 million euro fine is often much cheaper than undertaking real work (300 million euros for the repair of a single bridge in Cologne), Deutsche Bahn sometimes prefers to let the infrastructure degrade voluntarily. Aging infrastructure, speed restrictions, and saturated hubs... Today, the German railway network is exhausted, literally exploited "to wear and tear" in the words of the Federal Court of Auditors.

German Train: Lessons and perspectives for France

The German lesson

The German experience highlights the importance of strong governance and a clear strategic vision. Deutsche Bahn (DB) found itself in an ambiguous position, oscillating between a subsidized public company and a private actor without real supervision, making responsibilities unclear and fostering buck-passing between the State and management: is it the fault of the government cutting budgets, of DB not knowing how to manage them, or of a hybrid model that seems difficult to control? Today, a debate is raging in the country: should DB be dismantled? Should it be fully renationalized, as Great Britain did? Should tracks be separated from trains? Nothing has been decided.

Fortunately, this situation is finally being taken seriously: the Minister of Transport, Volker Wissing, has announced a historic investment plan of 86 billion euros by 2029, including 45 billion specifically dedicated to the modernization of railway infrastructure by 2027. This funding will be partially covered by an increase in the heavy goods vehicle tax, marking a strategic shift in favor of rail, and is part of a broader economic recovery plan of 500 billion euros.

Towards a renewal of German Rail?

This investment plan aims to transform the network: thousands of kilometers of tracks, bridges, and installations will be renovated, signaling will be modernized, and tracks will be electrified. Temporary line closures are even planned for in-depth renovations, limiting long-term disruptions. In parallel, Olaf Scholz's government has initiated major structural reforms. DB will refocus on its core business by selling subsidiaries like DB Schenker and DB Arriva to reduce its debt. A new entity, DB Infra, will be created to manage tracks and stations in a non-profit and transparent manner, reinvesting all its profits in network maintenance. Concrete measures are also being implemented for users, including the hiring of technicians, the installation of breakdown detection sensors, and the optimization of connections.

Despite everything, the recovery of DB promises to be complex, and user confidence will be difficult to regain. Modernizing a network of nearly 40,000 km while maintaining its operation represents a titanic challenge, inevitably leading to short-term disruptions. Will Germany be able to become a reference again in terms of sustainable, reliable, and high-performance rail transport, thus promoting modal shift from road to rail for passengers and freight? To be continued...

And France: How to avoid the same scenario?

The German example raises a crucial question for France: has SNCF managed to avoid the same pitfalls? While the models and histories of the two countries diverge, similarities appear in their dysfunctions. The 1997 SNCF reform, aiming to separate network management (RFF) from the operator, did not produce the expected results. RFF, underfunded, could not prevent the degradation of the classic network, while SNCF prioritized the success of the TGV. Today, the average age of French tracks exceeds 30 years, many small lines are abandoned, and speed restrictions due to safety concerns are multiplying, with sometimes derisory average speeds on certain regional lines. The French Court of Auditors also pointed out in 2021 a growing debt due to insufficient public funding.

Although the French situation is not yet as critical as in Germany, particularly thanks to the technological and commercial showcase of the TGV and its good punctuality, the classic French network (TER and INTERCITÉS) suffers from comparable ills to those of the German network. We find there the same chronic underinvestment, a strong dependence on regional subsidies, frequent delays, and aging rolling stock. Ultimately, France and Germany share the risk of railway decline if decisive measures are not taken. Despite common assets such as high speed, the extent of their networks, and cutting-edge engineering, both countries also face the same adversary: the powerful automotive and road lobby, which has often hindered rail funding. As the German Court of Auditors points out, the fundamental question remains whether railways should be oriented towards profit or the common good.

Finally, the story of the degradation of Deutsche Bahn is as worrying as it is instructive. It demonstrates that a railway network can quickly unravel without investment or a long-term vision, even in a developed country. It also highlights the essential levers for a robust railway system: sustained funding, clear governance, a strong operational culture, and a focus on public interest. Today, to avoid a similar scenario, SNCF would need an additional billion euros per year by 2028 for the maintenance and development of its own network... Let's hope that the current DB crisis sparks a general awareness of the value of rail. As the CEO of SNCF emphasized, the train is "a common good bequeathed by our ancestors," a collective heritage that it is our responsibility to pass on in good health to future generations.