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Before we get to the heart of the matter, let’s try a little thought experiment: You need to get from point A to point B, and you have a choice between two trains. One takes you there in 2 hours, the other in 1 hour. Which one do you choose? The answer may seem obvious to you. But let’s put it to the test with a very specific example: the Bordeaux-Toulouse high-speed rail line (LGV).
You’ve probably already heard about it, since it’s become one of the most controversial issues in the French rail industry. On paper, though, it’s exactly the kind of project we should love at HOURRAIL!: a mode of transportation that’s chipping away at air travel’s market share and easing traffic congestion. So, what’s the hold-up? Lisa discussed the topic with Thierry from the YouTube channel Aiguillages, and here’s what we learned.
In 1981, France marveled at its very first TGV, the Paris-Lyon line. In the wake of that, other high-speed routes were planned, including the Bordeaux-Toulouse line. Since then, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, and Bordeaux have each been connected by their own high-speed lines. All of them, except Toulouse, France's fourth-largest city by population. Even today, the trip from Paris to Toulouse takes an average of 4 hours and 30 minutes by TGV, and up to 7 hours by INTERCITÉS.
When you love trains, the length of the trip isn't really an issue: strolling around inside, reading, working, and watching the scenery often feels more like a pleasure than a chore. The real competitor is the plane, which connects Paris to Toulouse in one hour. Toulouse is also the global capital of the aerospace industry, which for a long time made the Paris-Toulouse route the top domestic route in France. It has since been surpassed by the Paris-Nice route, but still holds second place. Suffice it to say that achieving a real shift in transportation modes along this route remains quite a challenge…
Today, TGVs do run between Bordeaux and Toulouse, but once they pass Bordeaux, they leave the high-speed line. Beyond that point, there is only a conventional line, shared with INTERCITÉ, TER, and freight trains, where everyone travels at the same speed. The GPSO (Grand Projet Sud-Ouest) is specifically designed to move high-speed trains off this shared line and provide them with their own infrastructure.
Behind this line lies another ambition: connect northern and southern Europe, all the way to Spain, via the Atlantic. Except that this major corridor has run into several roadblocks. The first of these is the Basque Country, where elected officials and the public have rejected any high-speed rail line on their territory; as a result, the line will end in Dax. The corresponding Spanish project, the “ Basque Y ", has also fallen far behind schedule. The Bordeaux-Dax line could be completed around 2035, and the connection to Spain, not before 2040. The famous " European connection ", one of the main selling points for the project, remains just a slogan for now.
From the initial ideas of the 1980s to the project we're working on today, 40 years have passed. Forty years—that’s how long it took five different presidents of the Republic to finally cut the ribbon for this line. It’s also the amount of time it took China to build—at nearly three times the speed—the world’s largest high-speed rail network (50,000 km).
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And the longer it takes for these major rail projects to get off the ground, the more they lose some of their original ambition along the way. In psychology, there’s a name for this: the sunk-cost fallacy.
However, this is not the only possible interpretation of this 40-year delay (as some of the feedback we received on our video survey points out!). One reason the high-speed rail line took so long to gain acceptance is that the air service The Paris-Toulouse service was of very high quality, with shuttles running every half hour. The less competitive the train is compared to air travel, the less urgent the political need to build a high-speed line becomes—and vice versa.
A real “ s a snake biting its own tail ", which compounds the sunk-cost fallacy. The more money, time, and energy you’ve already poured into a project, the less able you are to stop it—even when it no longer really makes sense—because you refuse to admit that you’ve “ lost "everything we've already put in there. In fact, it's exactly the same mechanism we had figured out for the Lyon–Turin, this transalpine route that has been in the works for over 35 years, also with Thierry from the Aiguillages channel.
So if this project is so complicated, Why do we keep going? Three arguments keep coming up: the estimated time savings (we'll come back to this later in the article), the competition with air travel, and the capacity freed up on conventional rail lines to increase the number of commuter and freight trains. There is also a more political argument: abandoning the project would, for the elected officials who have championed it for decades, amount to accepting a two-tier rail system in France.
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The figure being cited is approximately 1 hour and 25 minutes saved between Bordeaux and Toulouse (2 hours and 30 minutes today, compared to the 1 hour and 5 minutes projected for the high-speed line). The problem is that this figure compares the future high-speed line to the current line, which has not been modernized and is even considered to be in poor condition. According to a study by the consulting firm Claraco, If we were to simply renovate the conventional line, the travel time difference compared to the high-speed line would drop to less than 20 minutes, at a much lower cost. This figure should be viewed with some caution, however: a report by SNCF Réseau (GPSO Mission), cited by the CESER Nouvelle-Aquitaine and by the Société du Grand Projet Ferroviaire du Sud-Ouest itself, estimates the time savings from modernization at between 7 and 27 minutes depending on the scenarios considered, compared to 56 minutes for the new line. In other words, the difference is reduced by about half in the best-case scenario, and not cut to 20 minutes as the Claraco study suggests.
Still, regardless of the exact figure used, this time savings is calculated based on a line that we choose to leave in a deteriorated state rather than on what a truly modernized conventional line would provide, and the comparison used to promote the project is therefore not entirely fair.
Building a TGV station right in the city center is nearly impossible, because the track must remain as straight as possible to handle the high speeds. As a result, cities like Agen and Montauban would have to settle for outlying train stations, such as Montpellier Sud-de-France or Aix-en-Provence TGV. The shuttle to downtown would then save roughly the same amount of time as would be saved if the regular line were simply renovated. A recent measure aims to address this problem: as of February 2026, operators who stop at stations classified as “ land use planning "earn up to 4" % discount on their tolls.
Of course, a station located on the outskirts isn’t automatically a poorly served station: for residents of these medium-sized cities who own cars (often the majority), driving to the station with access to inexpensive long-term parking may be more convenient than traveling to a congested city center, and a good tram or bus connection can mitigate the problem. This is an argument worth taking seriously, but it doesn’t apply to everyone: it overlooks downtown residents who lose a direct connection, and more broadly, non-motorized commuters, for whom the additional shuttle negates much of the time savings promised by the high-speed rail line.
The most telling example remains that of Marmande, a town of 17,000 residents in Lot-et-Garonne, which is still served today by the Bordeaux-Marseille INTERCITÉS train. The town’s mayor says he received a letter from the Minister of Transportation stating that these trains are intended to run on the new Bordeaux-Toulouse line, which will never stop in Marmande. This is a concrete example of what the TGV is often criticized for: the reduction of commuter service in favor of high-speed rail.
Admittedly, on paper, there is nothing to prevent the two networks from coexisting rather than competing: a high-speed train (TGV) on the new line for connections between major cities (Paris–Bordeaux–Toulouse, or even further), and, in parallel, more frequent TER and INTERCITÉS service on the freed-up conventional line, with connections in Bordeaux or Agen for residents of Marmande. However, this scenario requires investments and political will that, for the time being, are not included in the project as it is currently funded.
To build 327 km of new rail lines, it is estimated that approximately 5,000 hectares would need to be developed: forests, farmland, wetlands, and protected areas—an area equivalent to half of inner-city Paris. The route also passes through 8 Natura 2000 sites, including the Ciron Valley, home to one of France’s last remaining natural beech forests, which is nearly 40,000 years old. It has become a media symbol of the protest movement, with demonstrations having been held in the valley for years.
Aerial view of the Ciron Valley, where one of France's last remaining natural beech forests winds its way through the landscape
Another sensitive issue: In September 2025, the Environmental Authority pointed out the lack of quantitative data and numerous gaps in the project’s environmental impact study. In the rail sector, there is talk of “ carbon payback time " : the number of years it will take for the emissions avoided through the modal shift to offset those generated by construction. No reliable figures have been provided for this project at this time.
In response to this, two points are frequently raised by supporters of the high-speed rail line. First, part of the route would run alongside the existing highway, which would limit the extent of destruction in those sections compared to a route built entirely on virgin land—although the Ciron Valley remains a special case. Second, another major road project—the Toulouse-Castres highway—is proceeding in parallel in the same region: a useful reminder that the high-speed rail line is not the only infrastructure project altering the landscape in southwestern France. But that does not change the fact that this project alone consumes an area equivalent to half of inner Paris.
In 2014, a public inquiry was conducted into the project. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the inquiry commission issued an unfavorable opinion on the declaration of public utility. The government signed it anyway, on several occasions. This decision was driven primarily by political considerations.
A declaration of public utility is not just an administrative formality: it is the act that allows the government to expropriate property in the public interest. To justify it, the following is applied: the “ balance sheet theory " : On one side, we list the benefits (time savings, flight rerouting, economic activity), and on the other, the drawbacks (cost, environmental damage, expropriations). If the benefits outweigh the drawbacks, the project may be declared to be in the public interest.
How can you compare an hour saved traveling between Paris and Toulouse to several thousand hectares of developed land? ? How much is an old-growth forest worth compared to the economic development of a major city? There is no mathematical answer. At some point, someone has to decide what matters most, and this kind of project can quickly turn into a turf war.
The two main driving forces behind the project are the Occitanie and Nouvelle-Aquitaine regions, led by Carole Delga and Alain Rousset, respectively, which are joined by the metropolitan areas of Toulouse and Bordeaux, several departments, and the national government. Support for the project also comes from chambers of commerce, regional Medef chapters, and associations such as Eurosud TEAM, which brings together local governments, businesses, banking sector representatives, and construction industry federations. In addition to these institutional interests, there is broader support among the local population—support that is less visible in the public sphere than the opponents demonstrating in the Ciron Valley, but nonetheless very real.
On May 7, 2026, the national government and the main local authorities involved signed a new memorandum of understanding: for the years 2026 and 2027 alone, the government commits to providing 410 million euros, and the local authorities the same amount, for a total of 820 million euros to continue studies, acquire land, and launch calls for bids. Shortly thereafter, the Prime Minister described the project as “ irreversible ".
Except that this does not stabilize its price: the 2022 financing plan projected a total cost of approximately 14 billion euros, but the Infrastructure Policy Council is warning of a risk of an increase of about 20 %. In other words, a project presented as irreversible, for which neither the final cost nor the definitive opening date is yet known.
For the project’s supporters, this line is intended first and foremost to correct a regional imbalance: according to the Occitanie Region, 60% of French people living more than four hours from Paris reside in Occitanie. With the high-speed rail line, the trip from Toulouse to Paris would take 3 hours and 10 minutes, compared to about 4 hours and 30 minutes today, and the high-speed rail version of the Toulouse-Barcelona route (already launched in Spain), illustrates what this connection could mean in the long run.
But there is no guarantee that the capacity freed up on conventional rail lines will automatically result in more commuter trains: We would also need to purchase trains, hire staff, and find a local government willing to provide long-term funding for these routes. This is precisely what 85 mayors and lawmakers are challenging; in June 2026, they called for the project to be halted so that funds could be focused on renovating the existing line and improving everyday transportation.
The TGV has been a true revolution since 1981: more than 126 million passengers traveled on it in 2024 alone. But its success has also meant that, for decades, the bulk of investment has been concentrated on high-speed rail, while the conventional rail network has aged. Of course, it is primarily the expansion of the highway network—rather than the TGV itself—that historically explains the disappearance of many small rail lines in France and elsewhere in Europe. But this does not detract from the fundamental observation: whether the primary cause was the highway or budgetary decisions favoring high-speed rail, the result is the same— the network has indeed been cut in half in less than a century, while investments continued to be directed toward ever-faster service between major cities.
A paradox that, elsewhere in the network, takes on a different but equally tangible form: that of commuter lines that continue to operate with aging equipment due to a lack of sufficient investment.
Ultimately, this topic isn’t just about a high-speed rail line; it raises broader questions about the choices we make as a society. Mobility researchers have noted that, historically, increases in speed have not necessarily allowed us to spend less time commuting. Above all, they have allowed us to travel farther. Sociologist Hartmut Rosa describes this phenomenon through The Paradox of Acceleration : The more technology helps us save time, the more we fill that time with new distances, new activities, and new obligations. We rush to save time, but the time we save disappears almost immediately in a new rush.
So, would you choose the train that takes two hours or the one that takes one? In reality, the real choice may not be so much this one as the choices we make regarding how we organize our territory—and, in a way, our ways of life.
The Bordeaux-Toulouse high-speed rail line promises a time savings of 1 hour and 25 minutes, but this figure is calculated in comparison to a current line that has been deliberately allowed to fall into disrepair: if that line were renovated, the time difference would be significantly reduced (estimates range from 20 to 27 minutes depending on the study, a figure that is disputed but never neutral). The project also involves stations located on the outskirts of towns, which eat into some of the promised time savings, the elimination of stops—such as in Marmande—and a significant environmental impact (5,000 hectares of land developed, 8 Natura 2000 sites), whose carbon footprint remains, to date, unquantified. Driven for 40 years by a structured political and economic balance of power, it has just secured 820 million euros in funding for 2026, for a total cost that remains uncertain. Behind this issue lies a broader question: that of the choices we make collectively between speed and regional connectivity.
Issue du monde de la communication et des médias, Sophie est Responsable éditoriale chez HOURRAIL ! depuis août 2024. Elle est notamment derrière le contenu éditorial du site ainsi que La Locomissive (de l'inspiration voyage bas carbone et des bons plans, un jeudi sur deux, gratuitement dans ta boîte mail !).
Convaincue que les changements d’habitude passent par la transformation de nos imaginaires, elle s’attache à montrer qu’il est possible de voyager autrement, de manière plus consciente, plus lente et plus joyeuse. Son objectif : rendre le slow travel accessible à toutes et tous, à travers des astuces, des décryptages et surtout, de nouveaux récits.
