The incredible fiasco of the British high-speed rail project: how HS2 collapsed
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Published on 1/14/26
In 1981, France launched the Paris–Lyon TGV at 260 km/h and positioned Europe as the global hub of high speed. For decades, the continent dominated: Italy accelerated, Germany followed, Spain deployed a spectacular network. High speed became a marker of power, modernity, and, in a sense, national prestige.
Then, in just fifteen years, a country with no high‑speed lines will not only catch up to Europe, but far surpass it. Today, China totals more than 48 000 kilometres of high‑speed lines, about 70 % of the global network ! This figure deserves attention: a single country concentrates the majority of the world’s high‑speed lines. To measure the contrast, Spain, though a European champion, has about 4 000 km of high‑speed lines.
How did Beijing manage to build at such a scale, in so little time? And most importantly: why? Behind the 350 km/h trains lies a strategy that goes far beyond transport. Territory, economy, power, influence… We explain everything.
And if you prefer to experience this investigation in immersion, you can watch our video :
To understand why high speed has become such a central issue in China, we must go back to the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, the country was undergoing a transformation: the economy was opening, industrialisation was accelerating, cities were growing at an unprecedented pace and hundreds of millions of people were gradually entering the market economy. This is the beginning of what many describe as the greatest economic boom in contemporary history.
But this boom quickly ran into a major constraint: the territory. China is a country as large as a continent, with megacities emerging on the east coast and a much more isolated interior. Connecting cities is not just a comfort issue: it is a matter of national cohesion, economic productivity and social stability.
Yet at that time, Chinese rail was far from up to the task. In the 1990s, trains averaged 48 km/h and some routes exceeded 24 hours. China was behind, not because of lack of interest, but because its priorities were elsewhere: lifting its population out of poverty remained the absolute goal.
That does not prevent the country from observing. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a trip to Japan and discovered the Shinkansen. The speed of that train deeply impressed him. From that moment, he was convinced that high speed would play a key role in China’s future.
You have to wait until 2004 for things to really accelerate. That year, the government adopted a key document: a medium‑ and long‑term national plan for the railway network. The goal is clear: build 12 000 kilometres of high‑speed lines, organised around eight major corridors (four north‑south and four east‑west) capable of structuring the whole of China.
At the time, the project seemed completely out of scale. And yet…
Everything changes on 1 August 2008, a few days before the opening of the Beijing Olympics. China inaugurated its first high‑speed line between Beijing and Tianjin. For the first time, Chinese trains ran at 350 km/h in commercial speed. At the time, it was unprecedented, and these trains could go faster than European TGVs.
The dynamic is set in motion. Three years later, China already operates the longest high‑speed network in the world. A historic reversal, extremely rapid at the infrastructure scale. For comparison, the French network is now 17 times smaller than China’s. The United Kingdom, the historic birthplace of the railway, still has no high‑speed line traversing its territory outside of the Eurostar. In other words, China has not only caught up with high speed. It has far surpassed it.
The secrets of the Chinese method
Speed of execution as a principle
the equivalent of the French TGV network built each year. This pace is only possible because China does not build line by line, but network by network. Early on, Beijing set a national master plan: start with the major arteries, then connect secondary lines. Result: dozens of projects launched simultaneously, everywhere in the country, with overall coherence.
Massive and assumed investment
Rail is made a national priority and borrowing is fully embraced. Today, China State Railway’s debt is around 800 billion euros. But for China, infrastructure is not just about profitability: it serves to structure the economy, connect employment hubs, circulate workers and capital. The reasoning is simple: we build now, the benefits will come later.
This ability to invest quickly and strongly is made possible by a highly centralised system. In China, large infrastructure is decided at the top of the state apparatus and largely executed by state‑owned enterprises. There are no long public consultations, no endless legal challenges. Routes are imposed, expropriations are swift, and decisions are rarely questioned.
The industrialisation of rail
Chinese engineers assimilate this know‑how and develop their own trains under the CRH, then Fuxing brands. By 2010, a prototype reached
486 km/h during trials. In 2017, the Fuxing CR400 sets enter service at 350 km/h . End 2023, China unveiled the CR450, designed for a commercial speed of400 km/h .At these speeds, performance no longer depends solely on the train. Rails are welded over hundreds of metres to avoid any break, catenaries are reinforced, tunnels widened to absorb air pressure, and thousands of sensors constantly monitor wear and weather. Nearly half the network runs on bridges or tunnels to avoid tight curves and unstable terrain.
China therefore did not just lay rails. It built a complete and independent railway system: giant stations like Beijing‑South, ultra‑efficient control centres, a digital ticketing system and unprecedented frequencies. On the Beijing–Shanghai line, a train circulates
every three minutes during peak hours . The network is remarkably efficient. And it is not a coincidence.The geopolitical strategy of high‑speed rail
tool in service of a political, economic and geopolitical ambition. .Unifying the territory and redistributing growth
For the population, this strategy is part of an implicit contract: accept the authority of the one‑party state and you will be promised that wherever you live, you will eventually benefit from the fruits of growth. The high‑speed train becomes then a concrete proof of this promise.
The effects are already noticeable.
Territories long out of reach experience a new boom thanks to the rail. China does not hesitate to build lines in sparsely populated regions to give them a new breath, even if they are not immediately profitable. The example of Xinjiang: connecting, anchoring, integrating The Lanzhou–Ürümqi high‑speed line, 1 776 km long, traverses deserts and mountains to the heart of Xinjiang, the far west of the country. It is the high‑speed line at the highest altitude in the world, and also one of the least frequented in the network.
anchor physically the region to the rest of China,
to facilitate movement in a sensitive area and to affirm the integration of the territory. High‑speed rail thus redraws the country’s map. Medium‑size cities gain attractiveness because they now become less than two or three hours from major metropolises. In a few years, the country has literally shrunk.A tool of global soft power
This success does not stop at Chinese borders. High speed has also become a tool of soft power. Building the world’s largest high‑speed network in record time is offering a
. Since the launch of the New Silk Roads in 2013, China has financed and built railway linesin Asia, Africa and elsewhere.
Most are conventional freight lines, but some incorporate high speed. This is the case in Indonesia, with the Jakarta–Bandung line, inaugurated in 2023. Today, CRRC has become the world’s first‑ranked manufacturer of railway equipment. Trains designed in China now circulate somewhataround the world.
. Long ago, when a country wanted to build a high‑speed line, it turned to Europe or Japan. What changes today is that China is increasingly seen as anew reference point
possible: a player that can propose full‑together, rapid‑to‑build and very large‑scale projects. And the next step: a model without limits? By 2035, China officially aims for
. A staggering figure. But this race also raises many questions. Some lines are lightly used, several stations are almost empty, sometimes poorly located or too close to other competing axes. Railway debt reaches about 800 billion euros,and its repayment largely relies on the central state and the provinces. Since 2021, Chinese authorities have begun to adjust the course. Beijing seeks to slow the pace, better select projects and favour inter‑urban lines more useful for everyday travel.The environmental question also arises. The train is a far less polluting alternative to the plane, but running trains at 350 km/h requires much more energy than moderate speeds. In Europe, the choice is different.
As David Goeres reminds about the TGV M:
“We could conceive a train going at 360 km/h, but that is not our goal. The ideal speed is around 320 km/h.”
So, can the Chinese model inspire Europe on some points, or is it too specific to be transposed elsewhere? The future will tell…
Issue du monde de la communication et des médias, Sophie est Responsable éditoriale chez HOURRAIL ! depuis août 2024. Elle est notamment derrière le contenu éditorial du site ainsi que La Locomissive (de l'inspiration voyage bas carbone et des bons plans, un jeudi sur deux, gratuitement dans ta boîte mail !).
Convaincue que les changements d’habitude passent par la transformation de nos imaginaires, elle s’attache à montrer qu’il est possible de voyager autrement, de manière plus consciente, plus lente et plus joyeuse. Son objectif : rendre le slow travel accessible à toutes et tous, à travers des astuces, des décryptages et surtout, de nouveaux récits.
